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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION
“How can we provide the greatest access to information to the greatest number of people? Filtering our search
results clearly compromises our mission. Failing to offer Google search at all to a fifth of the world's population,
however, does so far more severely.” -Andrew McLaughlin, Senior Policy Counsel at Google

When Google entered the Chinese market in 2006, they faced heavy criticism worldwide
for going against their company values and everything they stand for. Instead of offering the
search engine available to the rest of the world (Google.com), Google, in compliance with the
Chinese Government’s demands, agreed to release a heavily censored and information deprived
Google.cn. Furthermore, in order to enter the Chinese market, Google also agreed to
continuously self-censor its contents for as long as it remains in the Chinese market. 1 The issue
of censorship once again rose to the forefront when Google discovered cyber attacks, originating
from China, targeting its corporate infrastructure. Further investigation revealed that the
attackers were primarily interested in accessing Gmail accounts of human rights advocates. 2 This
time, Google’s response was diametrically different from the one they issued in 2006—this time,
they threatened to pull out of the Chinese market.
The different statements issued by Google can be attributed to the discrepancy between
the company’s envisioned model and the reality that exists today in China. According to Elliot
Schrage, the VP of Global Communications at Google, Google entered the market in order to
make a contribution to the access of information in China and because Google believed that the
internet was transforming, or in better words, liberalizing China. Furthermore this liberalization
will be expedited by demand by the people for more information and better services—
competition among firms (or economic development) offering services and information will

1

Elliot Schrage Testimony before Congress on Internet in China.
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2006/02/testimony-internet-in-china.html
2
Google Blog: A New Approach to China. January 12, 2010. http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/newapproach-to-china.html
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eventually lead to the demise of censorship. 3 However, recent developments and Google’s
overall experience in China has indicated otherwise.
1.1 Authoritarian Regimes and Maintaining Control
The argument Google employed to justify their entrance into the Chinese government is
not a new one. It is commonly believed that authoritarian regimes cannot maintain control after
economic liberalization because it becomes too difficult to monitor every faucet of information
flow. Scholars argue that development leads to improvements in infrastructure and technology
which can allow for increased communications, and the emergence of intermediary organizations
political competitors. All of these factors can challenge authoritarian control. 4 Therefore,
economic growth and maintaining authoritarian control are two incompatible goals. This
argument has been accepted by the international community ever since the fall of the Soviet
Union.
The Soviet Union tried to pursue both economic development and information control
through a pursuing a self-sufficient closed economy. 5 The ideal outcome was that the country
would be able to maintain all forms of information flow while enjoying economic growth and
development. However, the system of central planning proved to be too inflexible. The central
government had control over every aspect of the economy—from communications to allocation
of resources and levels of production. The scope of the project was simply too big for the
government to impose such strict rules on. There were many degrees of inefficiency attributed to
the limited scope of priorities assigned by the government. Finally, the subordinates carrying out
3

Elliot Schrage Testimony before Congress on Internet in China.
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2006/02/testimony-internet-in-china.html
4
Huber, Rueschemeyer, and Stephens, “The Impact of Economic Development on Democracy,” The Journal of
Economic Perspectives, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Summer, 1993): 75; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Downs “Development
and Democracy,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 5 (Sept. – Oct. 2005): 80.
5
CIA World Fact Book. Accessed on April 5th, 2010. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/rs.html
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the government’s plans did not have sufficient information or knowledge, which resulted in high
coordination costs that undermined the entire system. 6 Furthermore, as the economy develops, it
becomes more complex. The problems faced by the economy are exacerbated because new
factors are introduced into the model. 7 Eventually the set-backs would result in the economic
depression or stagnation witnessed in the USSR during the Cold War. The drive for economic
reform came under the regime of Gorbachev in the mid 1980s. The reform planned to move the
USSR towards a market economy. Due to the economic system in place, it would have been
impossible for Gorbachev to reform economic policy without incorporating some sort of political
reform as well. This came in the form of loosening information controls. Karklins argues that
this was Gorbachev’s fatal mistake. Gorbachev started liberalizing information flow as an
attempt to placate the public by demonstrating that the party was dealing with societal problems.
However, the opposite effect occurred: this liberalization act allowed individuals and dissidents a
public forum to broadcast their criticism. 8
Although the USSR case successfully fits into the accepted theory, China is an entirely
different story. China has been experiencing monstrous growth levels since Deng Xiaoping’s
economic reforms and is one of the fastest developing nations. GDP growth in China has
averaged 9.9% between 1980 and 2008. 9 In terms of GDP adjusted for PPP, China ranks second,
right after United States. 10 Despite the high levels of economic growth and development
experienced by China in the last two decades, a very different picture exists in the political arena.
The CCP is the sole political entity in China and it enjoys unchallenged authority. Even more

6

Richard E. Ericson, “The Classical Soviet-Type Economy: Nature of the System and Implications for Reform,”
The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Autumn, 1991):12-21
7
Ibid, 22-23.
8
Rasma Karklins, “Explaining Regime Change in the Soviet Union.” Europe-Asia Studies. Vol. 46, No. 1 (1994):
34.
9
IMF, World Economic Outlook 2009. Accessed at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/pdf/text.pdf
10
World Bank 2008 data
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surprisingly, China has been able to maintain said control in a much more technologically
advanced society what the USSR faced. With the USSR, the regime only had to monitor print,
television, and radio. These types of platforms can be easily controlled and monitored by the
government through control over the agencies that broadcast and distribute the content—
individuals did not have the ability to generate or distribute information on their own, and, thus,
were dependent on the government for information. 11 However, in China, the masses are now
able to make their opinions known. They can circumvent the government agency when it comes
to information and news because they have access to far more advanced technologies, in
particular the World Wide Web. The widespread presence of utilization of the internet and
communications services like mobile phones and text messaging has connected the entire
country. Furthermore, this also allows individuals to transfer and access information
instantaneously. This new technology empowers the individual rather than the government. The
question of interest in this case is: how has Chinese government been able to maintain its
authoritarian regime despite the rapid economic liberalization taking place within the country?
Recent research on the subject has analyzed the conditions under which authoritarian
regimes can be preserved along with economic development. Scholars capitalize on the reality
that authoritarian regimes are able to create and manipulate political institutions to their
advantage. 12 Keohane and Nye argue that, while the improvements in technology have increased
access to information, “information does not flow in a vacuum.” 13 The change occurs in a system
where political structure already exists. This is a system where political institutions are in place

11

Gayle Durham Hollander, “Recent Developments in Soviet Radio and Television News Reporting.” The Public
Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Autumn 1967): 359-365.
12
de Mequita and Downs “Development and Democracy,” 2005; Chen, “Capitalist Development, Entrepreneurial
Class, and Democratization in China,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 117, No. 3 (Autumn, 2002).
13
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, “Power and Interdependence in the Information Age.” Foreign Affairs. Vol. 77,
No. 5 (Sept/Oct, 1998): 81-94
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to monitor and regulate the spread of information. 14 In essence they argue that states have
institutional tools to counter the effect of information liberalization. Meanwhile, Bruce Bueno de
Mesquita sets forth the argument that authoritarianism is maintained by the prohibition of
“coordination goods,” whereas An Chen’s focus on China reveals that it is the planned
capitalism and the gains it creates for entrepreneurs that allows the government to retain
control. 15 These studies offer preliminary data on the topic, but they lack specificity of how
control can be maintained in China and what factors affect the degree of information control.
1.2 Controlling Information Flow
Maintaining censorship depends on many different factors, not all of which can be
monitored by the governmental bureaucracy. As economic development brings transparency and
global integration, it becomes harder for the government to control information on two levels.
First, there are far too many channels of information to overlook, and second, access to
information becomes necessary for maintaining development. Figure 1 (next page) shows the
magnitude of change economic development brings to a nation in terms of censorship concerns.
For example, development and trade forces a country to open up its borders, which allows more
mobility on the people’s part and more information flow. This allows citizens to be exposed to
new ideas and unadulterated sources of information from abroad. The breadth of information
would contribute to an education revolution and create forums where new academic debates
could occur. Furthermore, this new openness exposes the citizens to the extent of censorship
present in their home country. As time progresses and the home country becomes more
integrated, people will be aware of all the options available to them through the prolonged

14
15

Ibid, 82.
Ibid, de Mesquita 84; Chen 407-412
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interactions with the outside world. With knowledge of these options, the citizens will be able to
decide for their own well-being, which might lead to changing preferences in the country.These
preferences could have political, social, and economic implications for the country as a whole.
On the economic front, the change would take place if people demand more goods or different
goods. In order to survive and maintain its market position, firms will have to respond and
comply with these demands. Furthermore, a likely demand that could be made would be for
more information. The government might want to stifle this change, but paradoxically economic
growth also depends on the transfer of technology and ideas across borders—information is
essential to growth. Unfortunately for the government, the openness created by economic
development means that the government would have to make a tradeoff between growth and
control.
1.3 Research Design and Hypothesis
Given the scope of the topic, covering every factor would be impossible. Every factor is
important to the censorship dialogue and each one would pose important implications to the
study of information control. They would all benefit from individual focus, but due to the time
constraint presented and the overall scope of the issue, rather than tackling all of these factors, I
will pick one factor to study. As a student of both Economics and Political Science, balancing the
competing interests of development and control are of utmost interest to me; in this situation, the
conflict between growth and control is displayed most prominently in the discussion of how the
government can maintain growth in the country without sacrificing its authority. In terms of
censorship, both direct censorship and indirect censorship must be studied because they are both
forms of control the government utilize; furthermore, this study will compare the two formulas to
determine which form of censorship is actually the most effective in controlling the flow of
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information. The hypothesis presented in this paper will be: the Chinese government’s ability to
control information flow stems predominately from its ability to persuade and convince
individuals and firms to self-censor through offering economic incentives to align their interests
with those of the government.
Chapter two of this thesis will focus on the role of direct censorship. For the purpose of
this thesis, direct censorship will be defined as the channel of censorship that the government can
mostly or completely regulate via its bureaucratic organizations. Therefore, it is of utmost
importance to analyze the structure and function of the censorship bureaucracy in the Chinese
Communist Party when talking about direct censorship. Furthermore, it is also necessary to
determine what kind of information can be censored directly and what kind of capabilities the
government has to engage in direct censorship. Chapter three will analyze the role of indirect
censorship and how it contributes to the government’s efforts to curtail information flow.
Indirect censorship will be defined as the incentives created by the government to encourage
self-censoring behavior from firms and individuals. It is important to study the means through
which the government can incentivize firms and individuals alike to exercise self-control. On the
flip side, attention must also be paid to why firms and individuals choose to engage in selfcensorship because self-censorship can only work if it is voluntary. Therefore, this chapter will
focus on how the CCP can manipulate the objectives of individuals, domestic firms, and
multinational firms to agree with those of the party.

Chapter 2: DIRECT CENSORSHIP
2.1 Censorship Bureaucracy
Censorship is not a recent development in China. It has been present since the Ming
Dynasty in the 1300s. The present form of censorship in China has its roots in the early Maoist

9
propaganda efforts during the civil war. The works of authors such as Solomon, Teiwes,
Schurmann, Schoenhals, Whyte, Johnson, Yu, and Chang demonstrate that Mao was masterful in
the art of propaganda—his regime used manipulative techniques to control information and to
indoctrinate the people. 16 The current propaganda system, called the Chinese Communist Party
Propaganda Department or the CCPPD, was created in 1977. It derives its form from the Maoist
system and holds the purpose of spreading Communist thought, and promoting the party’s
policies. Due to the sensitive nature of the work done, the department is incredibly secretive and
most employees must be highly educated with at least a Masters degree. In addition, the
department head must be a politburo member. 17 The strict requirements reflect the magnitude of
work done by the department: the bureaucracy has jurisdiction over every medium that transmits
information. 18 Estimates in 2003 show that the department was responsible for overseeing 2,262
television stations, 2,119 newspapers, 9,074 periodicals, 1,123 publishing houses, hundreds of
internal circulation papers, and all internet and mobile phone users. 19
The department is a bureaucratic system with many different agencies in charge of the
different media and social outlets. Furthermore, the department differentiates between internal
and external propaganda. External propaganda is aimed towards promoting Chinese policies and

16

Richard Solomon, Mao’s Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture, Berkeley: University of California Press,
1971; Frederick Yu, Mass Persuasion in Communist China, New York: Praeger, 1964; Michael Schoenhals, Doing
Things with Words in Chinese Politics, Berkeley: University of California Institute of East Asian Studies, 1992;
Alan P. L. Liu, Communications and National Integration in Communist China, Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1971; Martin King Whyte, Small Groups and Political Rituals in China, Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1974; Chalmers Johnson (ed.), Ideology and Politics in Contemporary China, Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 1973.
17
Anne Marie Brady. Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China. New York,
NY: Rownman & Littelfield Publishers, Inc., 2008. 13-22.
18
David Shambaugh, “China’s Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes and Efficacy,” The China Journal, No.
57 (January 2007): 28
19
National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook 2004 (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2004):
844-46, 853; Xiao Qiang, Director of China Internet Project, Graduate School of Journalism, University of
California, Berkeley, “Prepared Statement” for hearings on “China’s State Control Mechanisms and Methods”, the
US–China Economic and Security Review Commission, 14 April 2005: 83.
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ideas to the rest of the world. 20 On the other side of the spectrum, internal propaganda has the
task at controlling information flow within the country, or essentially, censorship. Censorship
guidelines and rules are passed down by the central government and then enforced on both
national and local levels. Specifically, local level departments are supposed to monitor and
censor “all non-classified sources of information in their region, including advertisement.” 21
Key departments that are enlisted in censorship or regulatory practices in the CCPPD include:
State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT), the Ministry of Information
Industries (Xinxi Chanye Bu; MII), the Ministry of Public Security (Gong an Bu; MPS), and the
Ministry of State Security (Guojia Anquan Bu; MSS). The MPS and the MSS are jointly in
charge of monitoring and controlling electronic communication and usage of the Internet
whereas the MII has “overall management authority” with access to telephone lines, fiber-optic
cables, cell phones, text messaging, faxes and et cetera. 22 It is important to note that the Ministry
of Information Industries was created in 1998 by the National People’s Congress as a
conglomeration of existing commissions and ministries. Most importantly, the MII was
delegated the task of overseeing the telecommunications sector. It is in charge of granting
licenses and providing hardware to the nation’s telecommunications network. 23 It was announced
in 2008 that the MII was dissolved and its functions were taken over by the new Ministry of
Industry and Information Technology (MIIT). In addition to the MII’s old duties, the MIIT is
also in charge of supervision of IT development. 24

20

David Shambaugh, “China’s Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes and Efficacy,” 48-49.
Brady, Anne Marie. Marketing Dictatorship. 94.
22
David Shambaugh, “China’s Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes and Efficacy,” 30.
23
Tony Saich. Governance and Politics of China. Comparative Government and Politics. Ed. Galen A. Irwin. New
York: Palgrave Publishers Ltd., 2001. 309.
24
OpenNet Initiative (2009). “Internet Filtering in China: A Country Study.” http://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net
/files/ONI_China_2009.pdf
21
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2.2 Telecommunications Industry and Internet Services 25
The telecommunications industry is perhaps the most important aspect to consider in
terms of direct censorship. Not only does telecommunications link directly to the flow of
information, but it also has economic implications. The industry existed under Mao as a
government supported program. It was owned and operated by the Ministry of Posts and
Telecommunications. 26At that time, it could hardly be called an industry since the 300,000 or so
existing phones were used for governmental and military purposes. 27 As an industry,
telecommunications did not flourish until Deng Xiaoping called for a better national
telecommunications infrastructure under the Four Modernizations in 1979 to sustain economic
development. 28
China’s telecommunications industry generally followed the three rules of
telecommunication development. 29 The first rule is that the government focuses on urban
growth—early rates in the mid 1990s show that the national average number of telephones per
100 000 was 4.7 whereas the rate was around 14 to 20.2 for cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, and
Tianjin. 30 The second aspect is state control over the industry—the government has had an
established monopoly since the Mao era over the industry via the Ministry of Post and
Telecommunications at first, and then by its successor, the Ministry of Information Industries
(MII).

25

Though the telecommunications industry is defined as both phone and internet networks, authors such as Harwit
normally define telecommunications as the phone sector; thus, going with that, in this paper, telecommunications
will refer solely to non-internet related sectors whereas the internet/internet services sector will be referred to as the
internet.
26
Lin Jintong; Wan Yan. “Telecommunications in China.” Mobile Services and Application, 2004: 5283.
27
Eric Harwit “China’s Telecommunications Industry: Development Patterns and Policies,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 71,
No. 2 (Summer, 1998): 179
28
Jia Lu and Ian Weber. “State, Power, and Mobile Communication: A Case study of China.” New Media Society,
Vol 9, No.6 (2007): 926.
29
The three requirements are from Eric Harwit’s “China’s Telecommunications Industry: Development Patterns
and Policies,” 175; 178-179.
30
Data from China Statistical Yearbook 1996 (Beijing: China Statistical Yearbook 1996), pg. 77, 534.
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However, it must be kept in mind that the government did not forget about the economic aspect
of telecommunications. When the telecommunications industry was first developing, the state
owned China Telecom monopolized the market. However, as development pace picked up, the
government recognized the need for a more competitive and more accessible network in order to
promote global wireless integration. In order to achieve that, the government introduced new
competition in the form of China Unicom in 1994 and insisted that China Telecom lower its
access charges in 1998. Following that, China Telecom was split into China Telecom and China
Mobile in 1999. In the next few years, the government would introduce many other players to the
industry. 31 In addition, the ownership structure of the companies were significantly altered—
China Mobile and China Telecom are both publically listed on both the New York Stock
Exchange and the Hongkong Stock Exchange whereas China Unicom is traded on the Shanghai,
Hongkong, and New York exchanges. 32 This change in ownership structure has provided the
firms with considerable autonomy and has allowed them to improve the services and enhance the
industry. Currently China’s mobile carriers offer five types of value-added services: SMS (Short
Messaging Service), WAP (Wireless Application Protocol), MMS (Multimedia Messaging
Service), J2ME (Java 2 Micro Edition), and BREW (Binary Runtime Environment for
Wireless). 33
Lastly, the government utilizes protectionist measures to keep foreign competition out of
the country. 34 At first foreign entities could not even invest in the Chinese telecommunications
industry. This aspect did not change until the late 1990s when China allowed foreign companies

31

Nina Hachigian, “China’s Cyber Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 2 (March-April, 2001): 119
See Google Finances
33
Jia Lu and Ian Weber, “State, Power, and Mobile Communication: A Case Study of China,” 931.
34
Eric Harwit, “China’s Telecommunications Industry: Development Patterns and Policies,” 175; 178-179.
32
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to supply equipment to the country. 35 But the caveat is that to become any sort of player in the
Chinese market, the foreign companies, in partnership with a domestic firm, must apply directly
with the government for a Joint Venture license. 36 Through the JVs, the foreign firms may help
manufacture products within the country and contribute capital—they are not allowed
management, operational or oversight duties. 37 The strict regulations on foreign investment
lightened after China campaigned successfully to be a part of the WTO in 2001. 38 As a part of
gaining WTO membership, China had to liberalize its telecommunications industry drastically,
which included allowing foreign firms to invest directly in the domestic firms. Other
considerations included making the regulatory system more transparent and just so that foreign
firms would not be disadvantaged. 39 Despite the concessions to the WTO, foreign nations can
only invest up to 49% share in the firms to ensure the state will remain the major stakeholder, 40
The trends seen in the telecommunications industry are similar to those in the internet
services sector. Like the telecommunications industry, internet services are the result of a state
initiative. 41 China first developed its data network in 1987 focused on connecting universities
and schools in order to facilitate scholarly exchange of information. 42 However, this was also an
opportunity for the government to politicize its agenda. In 1999, the central government started
the Government Online Project which publicized political information via websites created for
central government agencies, State Owned Enterprises, and other local and national political

35

Kenneth DeWoskin, “The WTO and the Telecommunications Sector in China,” The China Quarterly, 2001: 641.
Aaditya Mattoo. “China’s Accession to the WTO: The Services Dimension.” Journal of International Economic
Law. Vol. 2 No.6 (2003): 323.
37
Eric Harwit. “China’s Telecommunications Industry: Development Patterns and Policies,”190.
38
China and the WTO. http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO_e/countries_e/china_e.htm
39
Tony Saich. Governance and Politics of China. 309
40
DeWoskin, “The WTO and the Telecommunications Sector in China,” 641; Harwit “China’s Telecommunications
Industry: Development Patterns and Policies,” 190.
41
Kalathil and Boas. “The Internet and State Control in Authoritarian Regimes: China, Cuba, and the
Counterrevolution.” Working Papers 2001. pg.5.
42
Harwit and Clark, “Shaping the Internet in China,” Asian Survey, Vol. 42, No. 3 (May/June 2001): 382.
36
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entities. 43 In fact, in 2005, the China Digital Times announced that 10 percent of Web sites
available to Chinese internet users were established by government agencies. 44
The focus eventually turned towards public consumption with the MII’s predecessor, the
MPT, as the regulator and the policy director of the sector. The services themselves were
provided by the telecommunication companies under the MPT’s jurisdiction. Private Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) were allowed into the market but due to the high fixed costs and lack of
capital, 90% of the independent providers were forced to leave the sector, leaving the MPT with
a monopoly on Internet services. 45 In the 2000s, as the number of internet users grew, the
government drafted laws containing requirements that Internet Content Providers had to meet in
order to provide their services—these include prohibition of pornography, gambling, and
counter-revolutionary materials. 46 Similarly to the telecommunications industry, the MII
eventually allowed foreign investment in internet services, but they were solely capital
investments with no say on content management. Furthermore, the government retains the power
to nullify agreements as they deem necessary. 47

43

Dali Yang. “The Great Net of China” 66.
William Thatcher Dowell. “The Internet, Censorship, and China.” Georgetwon Journal of International Affairs.
Vol. 112 (2006): 114.
45
Ibid, 387-391
46
“China Issues Long Awaited Internet Rules,” Agence France Presse, October 3, 2000; There are 11 types of
content that have been illegal to produce or disseminate: 1) violating the basic principles as they are confirmed in the
Constitution; 2) endangering state security, divulging state secrets, subverting the national regime, or jeopardizing
the integrity of national unity; 3) harming national honor or interests; 4) inciting hatred against peoples, racism
against peoples, or disrupting the solidarity of peoples; 5) disrupting national policies on religion, propagating evil
cults and feudal superstitions; 6) spreading rumors, disturbing social order, or disrupting social stability; 7)
spreading obscenity, pornography, gambling, violence, terror, or abetting the commission of a crime; 8) insulting or
defaming third parties, infringing on legal rights and interests of third parties; and 9) other content prohibited by law
and administrative regulations; 10) inciting illegal assemblies, associations, marches, demonstrations, or gatherings
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44

This is listed in Article 19 of the Provisions on the Administration of Internet News Information Services (Internet
News Information Services Regulations) (hulianwang xinwen xinxi fuwu guanli guiding), which was handed down
by the State Council Information Office and the Ministry of Information Industry on September 25, 2005.
Translation is available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=24396.
47
Harwit and Clark, “Shaping the Internet in China,” 399; Nina Hachigian. “China’s Cyber-Strategy.” 125.
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Although the government has a level of control over information flow through their
practices, the growth of telecommunications and internet use poses quite a problem for the
government. The table below shows the incredible pace at which the Chinese
telecommunications sector has grown.
Table 1
Year
Land
phone
(users per
100)
Mobile
Phone (in
millions)
Internet
(in
millions)

1950
0.056

1980
0.43

1990
1.11

1995
4.66

2000
20.1

2005
N/A

2008/2009
27

N/A

N/A

N/A

3.63

144

388

670

N/A

N/A

N/A

0.002

22.5

111

338

When the mobile phone network was first set up, there were only 3.63 million users, but as of
May 2009, there are 670 million cell phone users in China. Furthermore, the 670 million users in
2009 represent a 1691% increase from the total number of users in 2000. 48 In addition, as of
2007 fixed line users increased to 370 million, which is a 5185% increase from the 7 million
users in 1990. 49 Furthermore, as of June 2009, there are 338 million internet users in China,
which is a 1440% increase from the 22.5 million users in 2001. 50 The scope of both mobile and
internet networks not only increases access to communication but also increases the speed and
frequency at which people pass information. Thus, this communications increase makes it harder
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for the government to maintain the flow of information. Compounded, this problem is
exacerbated by the new improvements in technology, such as video recording phones, which
allows users to pass on real time information through mobiles or the internet. 51
The government’s solution to the problem lies in the second and third trend of
development—state ownership and controlled foreign investment. Both Harwit and DeWoksin
argue that the restrictions placed on telecommunications are for purely economic reasons—the
states gain a lot of revenue from operating the systems themselves and they wanted to protect
their financial interests. On the other hand, the authors agree that the measures taken to control
the Internet are purely for political reasons. 52 However, there is a discrepancy between these
beliefs since actions taken by the government in the telecommunications industry are similar to
those taken to retain control over data networks on the internet. In both cases, foreign companies
are welcomed to invest in equity shares, but aren’t allowed to partake in management decisions
or outright develop their own services in each industry. 53 In addition, in statements issued by the
MII, officials clearly state that both the telecommunications industry and Internet services are
kept under state control due to security interests. 54
In both cases, direct control over the companies providing services allows the
government to directly monitor the flow of information to and from the people. However, direct
control over the telecommunications industry is harder to achieve now due to the fact all three
providers (China Unicom, China Telecom, and China Mobile) are publically listed. There does
exist a caveat though—under state regulations, the state must own at least 51% of the equity
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shares in said companies. 55 Technically speaking, the companies themselves own the
communications infrastructure and therefore can do whatever they want. 56 Thus it is in the
government’s best interest to retain a majority of the individual companies’ share in order to
possess any sort of operational control. The level of control is further enhanced by the fact that
the government does not have to deal with the existence of a principal-agent dilemma where the
industry and the government have different interests in mind. This principal-agent dilemma is
reduced by the fact that censorship does not clash with the long-term goal of industry
development and growth—both the government and the firms want to sustain growth in the
sector. Therefore, the corporations know that cooperating with the government is in their best
interest, and that they are unlikely to suffer negative consequences by doing so. In addition, the
principal-agent dilemma is further dissolved by the existence of a revolving door policy in the
telecommunications sector—all of the executive members on the board of directors in China
Telecom, China Unicom, and China Mobile are past government officials who specialized in
either telecommunications or information control. 57 It is important to differentiate between
executive directors and non-executive directors because of their different roles. Executive
directors are the ones who actually run the firm and are involved with the day to day operations
of the firm. Therefore, in order to affect the operations of these firms, it is more advantageous for
the government to have ties with these directors rather than the non-executive directors. As
shown by Table 2, all of the executive directors have ties with the government.
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Table 2-Board and Senior Management Composition 58
Firms

Total
Members

No
Government
Background

Central Government
Censorship or
Telecom Background

China
Mobile

13 (9
executive
directors, 4
nonexecutive
directors)
14 (8
executive
directors, 6
nonexecutive)
10 (4
executive
directors; 6
nonexecutive
directors)

4 (All nonexecutive
directors)

China
Telecom

China
Unicom

Other
Government
Background

4

Local Telecom or
Censorship
Regulation
Background
5

2 (All nonexecutive
directors)

3

5

4

4 (All Nonexecutive
directors)

2

2

2

0

Thus, it can be assumed that these members have been fully indoctrinated by the government and
are aligned with government attitudes when it comes to censorship.
The influence that the government has over the telecommunications sectors has helped
the government maintain control and successfully execute its policies in many situations. This
relationship was obvious in the wake of the Uighur demonstrations. The catalyst of the unrest
was a brawl that happened in a Shaoguan factory between Hans and Uighurs in June. Some of
the Han workers went into a Uighur dormitory, killed 2 Uighur males, and injured many others
because there were rumors that the Uighurs had raped Han women in the factory. After the
incident, many Uighurs felt that the government was playing down the number of casualties and
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that the incident was not well handled. Thus, with the tensions rising, the unrest started on the
evening of July 5th, 2009. Overnight, the fighting resulted in 156 deaths and more than 1000
casualties, many of whom were Han Chinese. The government moved quickly and locked down
the city on July 6th. They imposed curfews and sent armed forces to patrol the neighborhoods. 59
In addition, the government was also able to cut off internet and phone access in certain areas of
Xinjiang. 60 Coupled with movement restrictions for foreigners, the government was able to
efficiently disconnect Xinjiang from the rest of the world. As of December 2009, the area still
has neither internet access nor the ability to text message or make international calls. 61 The
government’s control and influence over the telecommunications industry is further
demonstrated by the decree issued in January 2010 that text messaging in the country will be
automatically scanned for “key words.” 62 Furthermore, China Daily had mentioned that
offenders of the policy (i.e. people who sent “illegal or unhealthy” messages) will find
themselves suspended from accessing and using texting services. The government has already set
up a special team to implement the policy. 63 In this situation, there must be full cooperation
between the state and the firms.
Similarly, although ICPs (internet content providers) are not beneficiaries of state funding,
the government still has a high degree of direct control over access and services provided.
Primarily the government can control the operations of the firms through state regulations. For
example, like with network providers, foreign investors may invest in ICPs (technology transfers)
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but cannot interfere with management of the content provided. 64 The second way is through
direct monitoring of the information provided by the ICPs. First of all, the ICPs are regulated by
the central State Council and they have to apply for a license from said council in order to
operate. The ICPs must also provide content that appears on their site and records of users on the
site for two months before they apply for the license. 65 But more impressive than all the rules
and regulations is the fact that these ICPs rely on the government for news content—they are not
allowed to generate their own news and must only republish government approved content. 66 In
doing so, the government is turning these ICPs into a propaganda tool for the state.
The Chinese government does not have to go through ICPs themselves in order to limit
material available on the internet. The government has developed their own tool to control
information flow—the Great Firewall, as it is known in Western nations. To support the system,
the government also have around 30, 000 human cyber-police to monitor Internet content. 67
Although sometimes faulty, the Great Firewall is one of the government’s most sophisticated
tools to deal with foreign data. In fact, the OpenNet Initiative of 2009 concluded that China
consistently operates one of the most extensive, technologically sophisticated, and broadreaching system of Internet filtering in the world on a consistent basis. 68 The firewall relies on a
router on the Chinese fiber-optic pipelines that filters search results or website requests made by
Chinese users. If the request is on the government’s blacklist or contains sensitive keywords such
as “falun gong” or “Tiananmen,” the router would automatically block those results. 69 Although
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there are ways to circumvent the Firewall via proxy servers, improvements have been made by
the government to tighten its control. As early as the summer of 2009, many of the proxy servers
have been blocked and are thus inaccessible. In addition, the government has become better at
differentiating between different types of media—Time magazine itself was not blocked but its
China blog was. 70
The government has been able to demonstrate that it exercises a lot of control via its
bureaucratic organizations and ties with the players in both telecommunications and internet
services. Through direct censorship, the government can control the flow of information and
control access to services due to the fact that they only have to patrol wires and networks. Direct
censorship is easy for the government to maintain; however, this is not to say that the
government can control all kinds of information flow. In fact, direct censorship only delays the
transfers of ideas and information—it merely creates inconveniences. In fact, sensitive
information that could be considered counter-revolutionary could remain online for hours or
days. 71 Furthermore, there are many ways that people can circumvent censorship either via proxy
servers or simply by foregoing internet interactions. Direct censorship, at best, can only be
considered a filter with a time lag. So, in this sense, direct censorship is not effective. In order for
censorship to be effective, it has to have an ideological aspect to it. Censorship must be able to
influence people so that they have no incentive or motivation to circumvent the direct
censorship—they are happy with what they can access. In a way, these people are voluntarily
following the rules of censorship. This trend already exists in China and therefore direct
censorship becomes inadequate in the study of why the government has been so effective at
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maintaining control because it does not address the issue of compliance. So thus, it becomes
necessary to study the contribution of indirect censorship to maintaining control in China.

Chapter 3: INDIRECT CENSORSHIP
A predominate theory on why self-censorship works in China relies on the effectiveness
of fear tactics. Scholars argue that it is the fear of punishment that drives the compliance shown
in China. 72 However, these fear tactics do not explain the entire trend of voluntary compliance
that exists in China. A 2005 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) study on urban
Chinese internet use found that people mostly use the internet for entertainment purposes instead
of news or politics due to the sensitive nature of many political topics. 73 In addition, a 2000
CASS study found that 10% of users admitted to regularly using proxy servers, 25% said that
they occasionally used proxy servers whereas, in 2005, the same survey was given and only 3%
of people used proxy servers regularly while 5.9% of people said that they used proxies
occasionally. 74 In addition, Rebecca MacKinnon presents anecdotal evidence that many people
know how to use proxy servers but they choose not to because they can access everything they
want via major Chinese websites that comply with government regulations. 75
It is clear that the people have the means to circumvent the censorship apparatus but they
rarely take advantage of such technology. Furthermore, the argument of retribution in the case of
individuals is unsubstantiated—the use of proxy servers, when available, does not constitute an
offense so grievous that would result in the government taking actions to punish said offenders.
72
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Therefore, in the absence of fear-induced activity, I argue that the voluntary compliance shown
by the population is merely a reaction to incentives provided by the government such that the
interests of the people and the government are aligned. A more comprehensive study would
focus on the influence of both the central government and local governments; however, this
paper will only analyze the role of the central government in inducing compliance. Therefore,
this section will study how the central government has been able to promote self-censorship
successfully through the development of nationalism in individuals, and the provision of
economic incentives to firms.
3.1 Nationalism in China
Nationalism is a relatively new development in China. Up until the start of the
Republican Period (1912-1949), culturalism was the dominant Chinese source of identity. 76
Culturalism, as a form of identity, was based on the common heritage and beliefs that were
shared by the people. While culturalism is based on shared identity and heritage, nationalism, as
it developed in China, is built on the humiliation and shame felt during the periods of European
imperialism and Japanese aggression. 77 The goal of Chinese nationalism is to restore China’s
position as a global superpower and return it to greatness. The Chinese are determined to never
experience the same humiliation and shame again. 78 Like Xiao Gongpin argues, Chinese
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nationalism is of a reactive-defensive type where it is activated in response to negative stimulus
from foreign forces. 79
The first successful use of Nationalism came in 1923 in Sun Yat-sen’s “The Three
People’s Principles” where he calls for national solidarity in the face of foreign oppression. 80
Leading up to this event, China had suffered through the Opium Wars, the Boxer Rebellion,
which led up to the invasion of China by 8 foreign countries, and the unjust 21 demands China
was forced to accept in Versailles. In all of these events, China saw its wealth and territories
stripped away and divided amongst foreign nations. Sun Yat-sen’s speech was a call for the
Chinese people to stand up for themselves—China could no longer afford to be a heap of loose
sand. This message has been reiterated by every leader since then, but most famously, it was
repeated by Mao in 1949, when he first came to power. He mentions in his iconic speech at
Tiananmen Square that China has finally stood up—the nation will no longer be subjected to
insult and humiliation. In time, he adds, China will emerge as one of the leading powers in the
international sphere. 81 It is this desire to restore China’s glory that drives nationalism, and it is in
the name of nationalism that the government conducts both its domestic and foreign policy.
From Mao’s disastrous social plans to Deng’s economic reform to the current economic
plans, every leader has used nationalism to bolster support for modernization initiatives. 82 In this
respect, nationalism is a part of state policy in a way where the state tries to create a sense of
“nationhood” among the citizens and demands the citizens to subordinate their interests to those
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of the state. 83 Therefore, it is through this perspective that current nationalism must be studied.
Throughout the late 1990s and the 2000s, Chinese nationalism has grown steadily as a reaction to
China’s perceived rise. The pinnacle of support came in the form of the 2008 Olympics. Since
the ping-pong diplomacy, sports have been seen as a form of soft-power that can measure the
level of economic modernization of a country. 84 As a continuation of that belief, the Olympic
Games have become a tool to promote the culture and elite status of the host country—the
Olympics have become a symbol of economic modernization and international status. 85 The
success of the 2008 Olympic Games, both in terms of China’s performance and the international
attention surrounding the games, marks a new era for China. China has proved to the world that
it is once again in the position it formerly occupied. Furthermore, with the international
recognition of Chinese modernization, the CCP has shown itself capable of aligning the interests
of the people with those of the party. 86 This success has bolstered CCP legitimacy and has
allowed the party to enjoy more liberties when it comes to its policies.
Although China has been able to overcome the century of humiliation and proved that it
is once again a force to be reckoned with, a part of present nationalism is still a reaction to
Western infringements on Chinese sovereignty and Western biases. This mistrust of the West has
been steadily building up over the years, and, as a consequence, this has led the Chinese people
to believe that government censorship is a necessary tool. The first offense took place during the
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1999 Kosovo War. On May 7, 1999, the US with NATO approval launched an airstrike in
Belgrade, where 3 Tomahawk cruise missiles destroyed the Chinese embassy. Following the
strike, President Clinton and NATO claimed that the attack was an accident caused by outdated
information. 87 However, few Chinese citizens believed this explanation and believed the attack
was an infringement of national sovereignty. Such an attack only served to remind the Chinese of
the humiliation and suffering they endured a century ago. 88 This feeling of Western imperialism
further intensified when a damaged American EP-3 spy plane landed on Hainan Island in 2001
because it symbolized another breach of sovereignty. 89 But the final blow came in March 2008,
when riots in Lhasa, Tibet broke out. According to official statistics, eighteen civilians and one
police officer were killed; 382 civilians and 241 police officers were injured; five hospitals,
seven schools, eighty-eight vehicles, and 120 buildings were set on fire; and 908 shops were
looted. 90 However, instead of sympathizing with the victims, the Western media saw the unrest
as a result of Chinese oppression and directed a media war against China. 91 The coverage by the
foreign media was followed closely by Chinese netizens. These netizens discovered many
discrepancies and falsifications within the reports. For example, CNN cropped a picture of a
Chinese man raising his arm to block a blow from a Tibetan youth who was holding a stick. In
the original picture the man was also surrounded by other weapon wielding Tibetans.
Furthermore, Fox published a photo captioned “Chinese troops parade handcuffed Tibetan
prisoners in trucks” when the actual photo was taken in India with Indian police dragging the
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man away. Other news agencies like BBC, the Washington Post, and the New York Times all
engaged in such fraudulent activities. 92
In the West, there is a belief that Chinese response over such incidents is orchestrated by
the government; furthermore, it is also common for those in the West to think that it is the
uneducated, propaganda fed section that believes in the anti-West movement in China right
now 93 However, as many scholars point out, this is a mistaken assumption and the Chinese have
legitimate reason to be angry. In addition, contrary to belief, those who were the most outraged
by the hypocrisy and displayed the most nationalistic feelings were actually the well-educated,
technologically savvy, multilingual youth that the West has identified as China’s hope for
democracy. 94 The obvious antagonism shown by the West in this event was viewed by the
Chinese as the West’s move to deny China its proper place in the international sphere. It places
the West in a negative light and pledges more civilian support for the Chinese government. In
fact, there is already belief amongst the people in China that censorship is necessary because the
clearly biased Western media tries to create havoc in China by presenting misleading facts—the
government is only trying to protect its citizens from these falsehoods. 95 Although there are
some inaccuracies in the reporting done by the Western media, it does not mean that the
incidents reported on, such as the plight of the Tibetans, are not serious problems. The protestors
do have legitimate reasons for rebelling—they have been severely oppressed by the government
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and treated as second class citizens. The government’s actions toward these repressed groups
cannot be condoned, but the party has been able to get away with these gross misdemeanors. The
government was able to manipulate the media to deflect blame and take focus off of its actions
by putting the spotlight on the wrongs committed by Western media.
3.2 Firm Objectives and Censorship
The government cannot rely solely on nationalism amongst its citizens to induce selfcensorship because individual citizens are not the only actors in an economically developed
society. Firms act as individual agents in society as well, and they often have far more influence
over the development of a nation than individual citizens; thus, it is necessary for the government
to influence the behavior of firms as well. A principal-agent problem exists with any
government-firm interactions where one party tries to induce certain behaviors from the other
due to the possible misalignment of interests. In the case of indirect censorship in China, the
central government serves as the principal that tries to induce the agents, or the firms, to adopt
self-censorship measures. The only way the government can induce such behavior from the firms
is to reduce or completely eliminate the possible conflicts of interest. So, in understanding why
firms comply with the Chinese government demands, it becomes necessary to study firm
objectives and whether they are aligned with government interests. It has been long accepted that
firms predominately try to increase their long-run market value. 96 This implies a multi-period
game where firms must invest in strategies that would better their overall position in the long run.
Thus, firms might have to make tradeoffs in between the periods such that they would sacrifice
some of their current position for future gains. However, because firms exhibit risk aversion,
such a tradeoff would only occur if the value of future gains clearly outweighs the present losses
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and also if this move puts the firm in an optimal position to take advantage of arising
opportunities. 97
Given the value maximization objective of the firms, it is clear, that as far as censorship
is concerned, the interests of the firms do not conflict with those of the government as long as
self-censorship does not negatively affect the firm’s performance in the market. But this is not
the case for many firms because self-censorship usually involves deploying both technological
and labor capabilities that would raise the costs of production incurred by the firms. Therefore,
the government must be able to compensate for the higher costs through economic incentives
that could offset the costs or through promises of higher potential earnings. However, this
outcome overstates the relative bargaining power of the firms because it must be noted that given
the position of the Chinese market, the government can leverage the firms through its role as the
market regulator and its ability to make “take it or leave it” offers to firms. This leverage is
further enhanced by the presence of competition in the overall market. Therefore, the following
sections will study how the Chinese government is able to persuade firms to undertake selfcensorship roles through economic incentives.
3.3 Economic Incentives for Domestic Firms
The previous chapter touched on how the Chinese government could effortlessly monitor
state owned enterprises due to the government’s majority shareholder status in those companies.
Private enterprises differ from public or state-owned enterprises in terms of objectives. For
private firms, the only objective they have is to maximize profits. Which means the government
faces the challenge of introducing political concerns to the objective of private firms. This task
can be avoided as long as the economy is dominated by state owned entities. The government
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will not have to implement some kind of apparatus to control private entities due to their relative
insignificance. However, because private entities do play a significant role in the Chinese
economy, direct control over functions is hard to achieve. The government has to either find
other means to monitor and influence behavior, or they need to minimize the number of private
enterprises.
The Chinese government is able to accomplish such grandiose goals because the market
in China is not completely liberalized. Victor Nee describes the current economic situation in
China as one of “politicized capitalism.” This system is one where there is no clearly defined
boundary between the political and economic spheres, and, as a result, the state is very much
involved in, and retains much influence over, the economic sphere. 98 This involvement can
manifest in the monitoring and enforcement of regulations in the economy that could affect the
performance of firms or their abilities to access resources. This section will analyze the areas
where the central government does retain those powers to affect firm operations and how the
government’s actions actually undermine the size and role of the private sector. Specifically,
focus will be put on how the government’s ability to affect firms’ investment and operational
plans shape firm strategies. Furthermore, this section will also look at how the government can
influence the actions of individual entrepreneurs through political means.
In order to incentivize agents to carry out the principal’s objectives, the principal must be
able to provide positive reinforcement for compliance and negative reinforcement for
disobedience. Furthermore, the reinforcement must affect the agent in a way such that it is in the
agent’s best interest to comply. In the case of obtaining compliance from the firms, the
government must be able to leverage the firms’ own objectives against them. The primary
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objective of firms is to survive and maximize profit; furthermore, the survival of firms depends
on how readily they can access capital to fund both operational and investment purposes.
Therefore, the government can control firm access to resources and use this control to influence
the behavior of the firms. The Chinese government has indeed created conditions where capital
is incredibly difficult to access—Yasheng Huang and Stephan Haggard have found that private
firms in China are among the most constrained in terms of access to capital in the global market.
This limitation can be attributed to both the structure of the banking system in China and the
laws regulating equity ventures.
Typically, firms fund their projects either by taking on debt or by issuing equity. In
China, financing through bank loans has become the second most prevalent form of funding—
around 30% of funding that private firms obtain are from banks. However, when you look at
total loans given by the banks, loans given to private firms in China are incredibly rare even
though the market has become more open. In fact, under market liberalizing conditions, private
firms should be receiving more loans from banks because their market share will have increased
over time. However, opposite trend exists in China. In the 1990s, the private sector found itself
receiving less funds than it did in the 1980s. 99 This anomaly is due to the structure of the banking
system in China. The current banking system in China is dominated by four state-owned banks:
the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, People’s Construction Bank of China, the Bank of
China, and the Agriculture Bank of China. Due to the ownership structure of the banks, the
government actually has the jurisdiction to decide who to give loans to. June Ma has pointed out
that the government imposes an annual credit ceiling on how much banks can lend out to firms.
This can be found in the government’s investment plans along with designated allocations to
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projects that the government considers significant. 100 Banks have become a tool to propagate the
government’s political agenda—the allocation of resources by banks has become an indicator to
the firms of government policy and objectives. 101 The lack of funding and the politicized
decision making process provides firms with incentives to comply with the government because,
in order for private firms to obtain funding, they would have to demonstrate that they are in
agreement with government policies.
Government control over access to funding does not stop at bank loans. The government
is also able to monitor and regulate other investment projects firms undertake. Victor Nee has
illustrated in his study that the government has a lot of influence over financial decisions such as
1) mergers 2) investment plans, 3) market entry, and 4) IPO listings and share issuance. 102 All of
these measures require approval from the government; however, the process with IPO listings
and share issuance is unlike the others in that it requires long term interaction between the firms
and the government. With mergers, investment plans, and market entry, the firms only need to
obtain permission once, but the government always has a role in regulating how a firm can raise
equity. The government’s role begins in the regulations concerning the Chinese stock markets.
Both the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges were created in 1990. 103 The stock markets are
unique in that they have a dual tier system. The primary market is where enterprises make their
initial offerings and the secondary market is where shareholders trade stocks. Under the Chinese
system, firms could either make an internal offering or a public offering. 104 Under internal
offerings, the firm can only sell stock to its employees whereas public offering issue stock to the
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public. In order to offer shares to the public, firms have to be listed on the stock exchange and go
through an IPO (initial public offering). In China, applying for an IPO is a highly complicated
and highly politicized process. Currently there is a quota on the number of firms that can qualify
for public listing. 105 The number of firms allowed to become publically listed is annually decided
jointly by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), the State Planning Committee
(SPC), the State Economic System Reform Commission (SRC), and the People’s Bank of China
(PBC or the central bank of China). 106 Finally, approval for an IPO is made by the CRSC, based
on factors such as the firm’s financial and management conditions, market conditions, and,
ambiguously, current government policies. 107
Factors such as conditions of the market and conditions of the firm seem perfectly
reasonable in talking about IPO approval, but, the introduction of “current government policies”
as a requirement serves no economic or financial purpose whatsoever. This ambiguous
requirement merely politicizes the process. Essentially, this requirement says that firm actions
have to be in accordance with policies that the government deems important regardless of the
type of policy. This is where censorship starts playing a role—censorship requirements are
something the state takes very seriously. Firm compliance with censorship policies can actually
determine when and if the firm gets approved for its IPO. The strategic value of complying with
government censorship guidelines is exemplified in the cases of Sina.com and Netease. Both
Netease and Sina are internet portals that provide news services and other informational content.
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Netease was founded in 1997 whereas Sina was created in 1999. 108 Although both websites
offered similar services, the approaches taken by the firms differed drastically. Sina took a far
more cautious approach towards providing news content. For example, Sina’s online news
stories were just republished copies of stories printed by the state controlled news agencies. 109 In
addition, Sina requires its users to register with the website with their real identities. In contrast,
Netease took a far more liberal approach to its services. Netease does not require user
registration and merely reminds the users of government policies and the implications of
violating said policies. 110 Furthermore, Netease also offers a bulletin board for its users to post
opinions on political and social issues. This bulletin board has been used by some to criticize and
vilify the government. These public posts directly challenge the mainstream message that the
government supports. One prominent case occurred during the 2008 Olympic bid process. Both
Sina and the government focused on commemorating China’s successful bid whereas negative
posts denouncing the decision were found on Netease. 111 Although Netease offered more liberal
services, it still followed the law, but its censorship practices were ambiguous and did not meet
the terms of government demands. On the contrary, Sina provided services that were, without a
doubt, fully in compliance with the censorship requirements. As a result of these differing
strategies, Sina was rewarded for its cautious approach—the firm was approved for listing before
Netease. 112 The timing of the IPO is critical because it affects the firm’s competiveness in the
market. In allowing Sina to launch its IPO first, the government gave the firm an edge over its
competitors because it can now raise more capital to use towards other operational or financial
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functions. Not only do firms have an incentive to comply with censorship demands before their
IPO, but it is also in the firms’ best interests to maintain this compliance afterwards as well. The
government’s influence over the firms’ capability to raise equity does not stop with IPOs. In fact,
firms must seek approval for all share issuance decisions after the IPO. 113 The government can
either punish or reward behavior as it deems necessary. Through this power, the government
ensures that it will receive continual compliance from the firms because both the survivability
and growth potential of the firms depends on their compliance.
As a result of all the restrictions concerning fundraising, State-Owned Enterprises are
heavily favored over private firms. As Lance Gore points out, the success of enterprises depends
on the support they can get from the government in the form of loans, tax breaks and project
approvals. 114 However, most of these economic incentives are reserved for state owned entities.
Therefore, given the setup of the financial system in China, there is no benefit for firms to
remain private entities. Firms are actually incentivized to change their ownership status. In fact,
Yasheng Huang points out that it is very difficult to define the private sector in China. 115 The
most obvious discrepancy can be seen in share issuing SOEs. These firms are technically private,
but they are under the control of the government. But there are other types of firms with more
ambiguous ownership structures. One such type would be collective firms that take the form of
township and village enterprises (TVEs). These firms retain their revenue rights, but they are still
very much government controlled in that the government has to give approval for investment and
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employment strategies undertaken by the firms. 116 Another prevalent example is the existence of
legal-person shareholding firms. Legal-person shareholding status indicates that other
corporations have a majority stake in the firm issuing the shares. In China’s case, the firms who
hold the majority stake are State Owned Enterprises. These “private firms” would then become
subsidiaries or affiliates of the SOEs, and thus, in terms of its ownership structure, become an
SOE. 117
The transition from the private sector to the pseudo-public sphere is known in the
Chinese market as “red-hatting.” Red-hatting is a viable financial strategy for firms because it
allows the firms to obtain access to resources that were previously unavailable to them such as
bank loans, power, rations, and political protection. 118 This removes the barriers to fundraising
and eliminates all of the unfair regulations these firms faced. Not only does this move eliminate
all the barriers private enterprises faced previously, but it also gains them access to information
pertaining to government objectives and agendas. These firms can place themselves in a better
position to receive more benefits through their knowledge on government goals. Furthermore,
this move allows firms to invest and take part in many of the high-growth sectors that are
prohibited to private industries. All in all, this move improves firms’ growth potential, viability
and competitiveness.
In the cases of the collective firms and the legal person shareholding firms, these firms
are often counted as part of the private sector even though their ownership status and control
apparatus indicate otherwise. Both of these types of entities actually make up a large proportion
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of the Chinese market. Including these firms in the private sector inflates the actual size of the
sector—in 1998, legal-person shareholding firms accounted for 40% of the private sector, and in
2005, these firms accounted for 31.4% of the entire Chinese market. 119 This revelation brings to
light a surprising trend—the actions taken by the government have the effect of limiting the role
and influence of the private sector. By doing so, the government is insuring that it has more
control over the overall economy and the effects of liberalizing the market. After all, actions are
much easier to monitor and influence if direct control can be exerted over the firms. This
essentially aligns the interests of the firms to those of the government without any form of
coercion—firms are willingly trading compliance for economic gains. Willing compliance is
always easier to maintain then coercion because the firms will not alter their behavior under
willing compliance unless their entire objective structure changes. Unless the government
renegades on its promises and barring any unpredictable events, these objectives will not change.
Although pseudo-private firms gain economic benefits from changing their ownership
status, the previous trends do not fully explain why purely private entrepreneurs comply with
government demands. Although entrepreneurs can gain financial profits through compliance,
they are still facing an ambiguous legal system that can be easily manipulated by the government
to take away the same gains. The most glaring absence of legal assurance lies in the fact that
entrepreneurs in China do not enjoy property rights. The lack of property rights indicates the fact
that the government can take advantage of any profitable situation and force the entrepreneurs to
give up their claims to what they have established. This is illustrated in the Xiu Shui market case.
Xiu Shui was a market established by local vendors in Beijing. The original market was an
outdoors market analogous to flea markets in the United States. Vendors would sell cheap local
goods, produce, and counterfeit designer goods. By 2004, Xiu Shui market had become a
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valuable and well-known brand name to tourists and local residents alike. Xiu Shui market at that
time came to represent a rent-extraction opportunity for the government. Due to the lack of
property rights, the government was able to shut down the original market and create a new
indoors market without undergoing any sort of legal procession. With the new market, the
government auctioned the right to manage the space to a private firm. The private firm then
started auctioning off the sections, and as a result of high bidding prices, only one third of the
original merchants were able to lease stalls in the new market. These merchants essentially lost
all rights to collect the profits from the brand that they helped to build. 120
This is a serious offense that cannot be mitigated with the provision of financial gains
because these gains can be taken away arbitrarily. With the types of restrictions that
entrepreneurs face, the question remains, why do they still stay in the system? Why is the private
sector in China still growing? Kellee Tsai argues that private entrepreneurs do not exit the
market because they do not have any other alternatives. 121 Furthermore, exiting the market
would also require government approval and the process of exiting would be costly. This is only
one part of the argument. The more logical conclusion is that private entrepreneurs have gained
trust in the political system because of the latest government policies. As the market grows, the
government knows that they cannot alienate the growing number of private entrepreneurs, or as
they are called in China, capitalists. Private entrepreneurs have found themselves being included
more in the decision making process. Entrepreneurs can actually collectively voice their
concerns through state corporatist trade organizations such as All-China Federation of Industry
and Commerce (ACFIC). These organizations are actually state organized and membership is
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mandatory. These trade organizations, in turn, let businessmen access the political sphere and
influence policies to their advantage. 122 In addition, the entrepreneur’s political influence has
been increased in a more direct way. In 2001, in his July 1st speech, former President Jiang
Zemin lifted the archaic CCP membership ban on capitalists and formally invited entrepreneurs
to join the party. 123 In allowing party membership, entrepreneurs can directly present their
interests to the party and influence party policy. Furthermore, as evidenced by the same speech,
the party has recently shown concern and understanding for the plight of the entrepreneurs. The
party has publically announced that problems such as corruption and bank reforms are state
priorities in order to placate the private sectors. 124 This exemplifies that the state does have the
private sector’s concerns at heart and is taking action to fix the problems. In a sense, all of these
measures taken by the government are ways to reassure the private sector without sacrificing its
control over the individuals or the market. Allowing private entrepreneurs to become party
members and to organize in trade organizations assuages their fears by including them in the
system, but also, it allows the government to keep an eye on these individuals to make sure they
are complying with protocol.
In addition to influencing financial factors, the government can also affect personnel
decisions in firms. 125 This influence is most apparent in the board structure of publically listed
firms. Under Chinese law, listed companies must have a two-tier board structure. They have a
board of directors whose job and makeup is very much like that of their western counterparts.
The board is elected by the top managers of the firm, and with approval of the board, the CEO
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and other top managers can become members of the board. Companies must also have a board of
supervisors, which constitutes the second tier of the board structure. The board of supervisors
monitors firm operations and top firm personnel. Members of the board usually include
shareholder and employee representatives along with individuals with government
background. 126 The governmental influence does not stop with the board of supervisors; in fact, a
2007 study found that around 200 of the 625 publically listed firms had CEOs who were
affiliated with the party. 127 The placement of government members in these firms plays a twofold role. Through the placement of party officials in these positions, the government can insure
that they can maintain informal network ties with decision makers in the firms. 128 Additionally,
these members directly influence the decisions made by the firm, so in this respect, the
government can be assured that the decisions made by the firms will be aligned with the interests
of the government. This assurance predominately comes from the fact that these members owe
their success and position to government support; therefore, they are first and foremost loyal to
the government. The second implication is that the government can obtain compliance without
providing financial incentives. Without having to cede economic benefits to firms, the
government can issue the same policies as before and therefore maximize revenues extracted
from these firms.
The government’s influence over individuals in private enterprises does not stop with its
ability to place party members in key positions. Over the past 20 years, China has experienced a
rise in what is called “bureaucratic entrepreneurism,” or better described as a rise in the number
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of party members engaging in private businesses. 129 In fact, many private businesses are owned
by party members who want to take advantage of the opportunities. In 1991, 7 % admitted to
being part of the party; whereas, in 2003, 33% said that they were party members. 130
Furthermore, Kellee Tsai has also found that the proportion of private entrepreneurs with state
enterprise or party backgrounds is rising. In 1997-1998, 11.5% of private enterprise workers
were former state enterprise employees. In 2002, 47.2% of the survey responders say that they
used to work for state owned enterprises and 23.5% of the responders were former managers of
state owned enterprises. 131 The rise of bureaucratic entrepreneurism has given the central
government more control over firm activities. These party members do not only respond to
economic incentives, but also political incentives provided by the government. 132 Like board
members and CEOs, these party officials owe their success to their higher ups in the central
government. Furthermore, many of these party members still retain their functions within the
party, where they dictate regional economic policy. Their performance in both fields is
monitored and evaluated by the central government. This evaluation can affect both their private
business and their status in the party. If these officials operate within the rules and carry out
government objectives, they are rewarded with performance bonuses 133 So, for these
bureaucratic entrepreneurs to succeed in both private business and in the party, they need to align
their actions with the objectives of the policy set forth by the central government—they need to
know what is taboo and what is acceptable at all times. 134 In this way, the central government
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control is strengthened because it gets to set one national agenda which is carried out by all of
the bureaucratic entrepreneurs without the need for supervision from above.
3.4 Experience of Multinational Corporations
The relationship between the Chinese government and multinational corporations is a
complex one. The government’s first goal is to receive as much foreign investment as possible to
promote domestic growth. However, at the same time, it also wants to control the effects of
foreign investment. Opening up the country to foreign investment inevitably means loosening
border controls, allowing more individual mobility and greater information flows. If this effect is
not maintained correctly, the government could face serious consequences that could jeopardize
its political power. So it is within the government’s interest to allow the optimal degree of
freedom needed for economic growth and still maintain political control. Therefore, the
government’s subsequent goal is to gain compliance from the foreign firm when it comes to
political or social issues that the government has a stake in. There are many arguments pertaining
to why firms invest abroad. These arguments include market structure imperfections, market
failure imperfections, market disequilibrium, and government imposed distortions. However, the
two most salient arguments explaining the rise of investment in China are market disequilibrium
and government imposed distortions. The market disequilibrium argument states that firms invest
abroad because of segmentation in the world markets—the rates of return are not the same across
countries. Essentially, firms invest in areas that have higher rates of profit. Whereas, in
government imposed distortions, firms invest abroad because government policies can create
conditions to incentivize investment. 135
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Foreign investment in China began as a reaction to stimulus provided by the Chinese
government. In 1979, Deng Xiaoping overturned thirty years of isolationist economic policy and
introduced an open door economic policy. This change was perhaps inspired by the success of
Japan and the four Asian tigers, but, most importantly, Deng also realized that foreign
investment was necessary to Chinese development on the whole. 136 China established and
introduced Special Economic Zones (SEZs), Open Cities, tax exemptions, duty free imports of
raw materials and technology in order to encourage investment. All of these measures had the
effect of lowering the risk and uncertainty of investment, which allows firms to feel more
confident committing resources and equity in China. 137 During the first 5 years following the
policy announcement, investment trickled in slowly due to uncertainty about the Chinese market.
Then, from 1983 to 1991, investment picked up when the government introduced policies that
provided more economic freedoms and incentives to the MNCs. Finally, in 1994, China became
the second largest recipient of foreign investment, a position China more or less retains today. 138
During this period of growth, China became a substantial consumer market as a result of its
economic development. By this time, whatever reservations MNCs had were diminished—China
had become the future of economic growth. Between 1979 and 2005, the GDP grew at an
average of 9.56%. 139 Then from 2005 onward, China has experienced growth around the 8%
mark. 140 This is an impressive feat considering that the rest of the developed world has
experienced stagnant or contracting growth during this period. Furthermore, as the rest of the
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world economy tanked under the current financial crisis, China cemented its role as the home of
future economic growth by posting growth levels similar to those they experienced before the
crisis. It is in the best interests of firms to develop in China so they can take advantage of this
growth.
The attractiveness of the Chinese market has another implication—it has given the
Chinese government more bargaining power with respect to Multinational Corporations. It is the
tool that the government can use to gain compliance from foreign firms without sacrificing
economic growth. In this case, the government can demand firms to comply with the rules and
regulations that it has put forth or else the firm will forego the chance to profit from China’s
growth. However, this is not to say that firms lack any bargaining power—the Chinese
government needs foreign firms in order to gain access to more modernized technology and
practices that would maintain China’s development and growth. But, when it comes to purely
political considerations, firms will defer to the government since compliance would bring
rewards whereas defiance would result in complete exclusion from the Chinese market.
The model used above can be applied to the case of censorship. Upholding censorship is
considered a state interest and therefore cannot be compromised. Therefore, the government
requires companies dealing in media and technology to follow the rules they set forth. The first
example of compliance came from the Star TV case, when Rupert Murdoch tried to break into
the Chinese market in 1993. News Corp bought Star TV for 3 billion dollars and Murdoch soon
announced to the world that modern technology had “proved an unambiguous threat to
totalitarian regimes everywhere.” 141 Following this announcement, the Chinese government
moved to ban the ownership of private satellite dishes and started promoting cable TV as a
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cheaper alternative to these services. 142 This move ended up harming Murdoch’s ability to
compete on the Chinese market at the same time as it increased access to government media.
Murdoch was losing money in his investment due to his refusal to comply with the government.
However by 1996, Murdoch was able to turn his fortune around. He teamed up with Liu Changle,
a former radio host with party connects, to create Phoenix TV. 143 Murdoch’s approach with
Phoenix TV was very different. This venture was welcomed and accepted by the Chinese
government because it complied with all rules and steered away from sensitive political topics.
Furthermore, Murdoch took this compliance one step further—the Chinese government wanted
an outlet to promote its views globally and Murdoch provided them with the chance to do so.
Phoenix TV transmitted its Chinese broadcast globally. 144
The Murdoch lesson would be remembered by future corporations trying to gain access
to the Chinese market. Companies like Yahoo and Microsoft entered the market in the mid 90s
and showed full compliance with government regulations; however, they too were frustrated by
the complications that still existed. Like Murdoch, these firms would turn to establishing Joint
Ventures with local firms in order to capture more market share and revenues. 145 These joint
ventures served two roles: they helped the companies to navigate the Chinese market better and
they also made sure that these foreign firms complied with Chinese regulations. Given the
ownership classification of the telecom and technology industries in China, many of the firms
that partner up with MNCs are state owned enterprises. These firms are fully aligned with the
government objectives. Furthermore, even private firms have an interest in complying with
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government regulations concerning censorship—they have everything to lose if they challenge
the government. Thus, these firms are unlikely to do so, and, in fact, these firms would often go
further than what the government requires just to be safe. For example, when Yahoo sided with
Google on the latest cyber-attack case, its Chinese partner, Alibaba, came out publically to
criticize Yahoo for its statement 146
MNCs have been harshly criticized for their censorship roles in China by international
groups such as Amnesty International and Freedom House. However, for the public, this topic
has only been brought to attention by the recent Google case. For Google, this case represents the
culmination of years of internal deliberation and tense debate with the Chinese government
despite the firm’s compliance with regulations. Therefore, this case is an example that illustrates
the hardships stilled faced by many Multinational corporations in China. However, recent events
have also brought to light the other side of the same coin. There are also Multinational firms who
have succeeded and gained from the system—Cisco is one such firm. Like Google, the firm has
found itself in the foreground of the censorship discussion because of its role in providing
censorship equipment to the Chinese government. The relevancy that these two firms bring to
both the MNC experience in China and to current events make them good case studies for this
discussion. Therefore, the next section will detail the alignment of government demands with
firm objectives through an analysis of the interactions between the Chinese government and both
Google and Cisco.

146

NY Times, January 17, 2010. “Chinese Site Criticizes Investor for Its Google Support.”

48

3.4a Case Studies:
1. Google:
Google was founded by Sergey Brin and Larry Page in 1998 with the mission to
“organize the world’s information and make it universally accessible and useable.” 147 The
company quickly gained market share and grew rapidly in the succeeding years. Finally, in 2004,
Brin and Page took the company public. At the time of the IPO, Google released another letter in
which it reiterated its mission to make the world a better place and adopted the motto of “Don’t
Be Evil.” 148 The commitment to this motto was most famously highlighted in December 2005,
when Google refused to provide user information to the Department of Justice. Google was
subpoenaed along with other internet search firms to provide records as a part of the effort to
uphold the Child Online Protection Act. 149 However, Google’s victory did not last long and the
firm found itself being criticized and attacked for giving in to the Chinese government when it
announced that it will launch a self-censored version of Google.com, which is called Google.cn,
in China. 150
Google’s interactions with the Chinese government did not begin there. In fact, Google
first accessed the Chinese market when it added Chinese language capabilities to its search
engine. However, due to the censoring practices of the Chinese government, Google.com was
constantly being monitored and filtered by the Great Firewall. The website was also reported to
be randomly subjected to blockages. Google reported on its blog that the Chinese users of
Google faced many difficulties: the entire website would be inaccessible 10% of the time,
147
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Google News was always blocked, and Google Images only worked sporadically. 151 Furthermore,
even when the users could access the website, it was incredibly slow due to the filtering done by
the government. 152 Finally, on January 26, 2006, Google decided to launch a Google.cn that
would comply with government demands for self-censorship. The reason given by the firm was
that launching Google.cn was the lesser of two evils—they did not want to deprive Chinese
citizens of a Google search engine. Furthermore, they believed that Google’s presence in China,
in addition to continual internet development would one day render censorship obsolete. 153 Until
then, however, Google would not offer services such as blogger or gmail to protect user
privacy. 154 The issue of censorship was pushed to the background until January 12, 2010, when
Google announced that the firm experienced cyber-attacks of Chinese origins which resulted in
both “theft of intellectual property” and individual gmail accounts belonging to human rights
activists being compromised. 155 In light of these attacks, which were believed to be government
supported, Google announced that it was unwilling to continue censoring its services. Then, on
March 22nd, Google announced that it will discontinue its Google.cn website and redirected users
to its Hong Kong homepage. 156
Although Google frames its actions through ethical or moral lenses, the arguments put
forth by the firm are not adequate enough to explain the actions it took. After all, Google is a
firm and it is the firm’s first and foremost objective to maximize long term profit. Therefore,
economic arguments must be introduced in order to explain the entire story. When Google first
entered the Chinese market in 2000, there were only 22.5 million internet users, or 1.7% of the
151
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nation’s population; however, by 2006, the number of users increased to 137 million people. The
Chinese internet and telecom industry had become one of the fastest developing ones and one of
the most profitable industries globally due to both demand from the people and from continued
government support. 157 Therefore, financially, it was in foreign telecom companies’ best interest
to enter the Chinese market due to both the high growth potential and low risk—China was
where all of the future growth would occur. At the time of Google’s announcement to enter the
market, the firm was facing fierce competition from some of the native firms such as Baidu and
Sohu. In fact Baidu offered services that were 7 times faster than that of Google. 158 Essentially,
Google was offering sub-par services in the Chinese market and the firm stood to lose market
share and any chance of remaining competitive in the market if it did not employ self-censorship.
In offering a censored search engine, Google had insured that it will have a place in the Chinese
market and will be in a position to benefit from the future expected growth.
Google’s decision to practice self-censorship is consistent with the solution of the
principal-agent dilemma. The action required of the agent by the principal does not compromise
any fundamental objectives they hold. Furthermore, complying with the principal’s wishes
actually enhances the agent’s ability to meet its own objectives. Therefore, the interests of the
agent and the principal were aligned. But this alignment was not permanent--when Google
decided to pull out of China, it was clear that the interests of the two parties had diverged. First
of all, Google did not enjoy the revenues or market shares it desired. In 2009 there were an
estimated 384 million users and the industry posted revenues of 10.9 billion USD. 159 However,
Google only captured 80 million of the users, or 33% of the total market, while Baidu is the
industry leader with 63% market share, a number that has increased steadily over the past few
157
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years. 160 In addition, Google posted miniscule revenues of 300 million dollars in 2008, which
only represents 1.4 percent of its global revenues. 161 Given the lack of growth, Google would
have less incentive to comply with actions. Furthermore, this incentive was lessened by the theft
of intellectual property in the cyber-attacks. This loss could have resulted in Google’s corporate
secrets and projects being revealed to its competitors. If this had offered, Google would have lost
a lot more than the miniscule gains they extracted in China. Therefore, the move to discontinue
its Google.cn could have been a strategic move to protect its corporate secrets. The decision to
discontinue the search engine could have also been reached due to the fact that Google will not
actually jeopardize the majority of its revenues from China. Most of Google’s revenue actually
comes from Chinese businesses posting ads on Google.com and from ads that they run on a
network of Chinese websites; thus, as long as Google retains its sales and advertising network,
they will continue to receive these sources of revenue. 162 In Google’s official blog entry on the
pull-out, the firm directly says that it will keep both its R&D forces and its Sales forces in
China. 163
2. Cisco:
Cisco Systems was founded in 1984 by Len Bosack and Sandy Lerner with the goal to
enable networks to connect with each other and share information from different locations. 164
Cisco is now the largest maker of internet infrastructure products in the world. In essence, Cisco
provides the equipment that allows network access to the Internet. It enjoys a majority market
share in both the enterprise router and network switch markets, which comprise the backbone of
internet communication between and within firms and internet service providers. Cisco provides
160
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these products and services to both businesses and governments alike. However, as of late, Cisco
has been criticized for practicing what some see as unsavory business dealings; in particular, the
firm is attacked for providing the Chinese government with the capabilities and necessary
training to run its massive censorship system.
Cisco first entered the Chinese market in 1994, but its first interaction with the
government came in 1998 when CEO John Chambers unveiled a telecommunications plan for
China. In this plan, Chambers outlined the economic potential that would be created by the
adoption of a widespread and robust data communications network; furthermore, he emphasized
that Cisco would be able to lead the change and connect China to the rest of the world. 165 Cisco
was taken up on its offer. In 2001, it was estimated that Cisco revenues from China was around 1
billion USD. 166 In 2004, Cisco signed contracts where it would provide the Chinese government
with its 12000 series routers to upgrade the Chinese network. These routers all contain filtering
capabilities used to prevent internet attacks; however, they can also be reconfigured to be used
for censorship. 167 Since then, Cisco has expanded its business in China and has been the
recipient of many lucrative government contracts. In 2009, Cisco reaffirmed its commitment to
doing business in China. In addition to its 16 billion dollar multiyear investment, Cisco will also
be opening 140 Cisco Networking Academy institutions to “provide information communication
technology skills to students” along with a new business unit in China to represent the GreaterChina region. 168
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Although evidence shows that the Chinese censorship capabilities come from Cisco
routers and switches, the firm has been adamant in denying any role in building up China’s
censorship capabilities. The company argues that Cisco offers the same products globally and did
not alter any of the routers or switches sold to the Chinese government. Furthermore, the
censorship capability talked about is the same feature that protects users from viruses or cyberattacks and therefore cannot be disabled. Cisco further exonerates its behavior by suggesting that
because Cisco is not an ICP or an ISP, it does not have the power to determine how the
equipment is used and for what purpose it is used for. 169 While Cisco tries to deflect blame, it is
impossible that the firm did not know what its equipment was used for; furthermore, there are
implications that the firm has willingly worked with the government to build up the government
censorship program.
The first and foremost piece of evidence comes from an internal Cisco presentation from
2002 that was leaked online. In this presentation, Cisco outlined what the Chinese government’s
telecommunication development plan looked like. These plans included: reforming the existing
organizational structure, reforming police forces, advancing information communications,
advancing the golden shield project, and fixing existing challenges. 170 To achieve each goal, the
government must obtain more advanced technology to support the growing network. Although
these measures seem innocuous, in the case of the Golden Shield project (synonymous with the
“Great Firewall”), the government’s direct goal is to enhance its censorship capabilities. The
evidence that Cisco knew what purpose its equipment was going to be used for can be found on
slide 58, where Cisco included a slide titled “Cisco Opportunities.” In this slide, Cisco
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highlighted the quality and reliability of their equipment, the access to technical training, and the
provision of operational maintenance.

171

It was later disclosed by Terry Alberstein, a senior

director of corporate communications in China, that the firm had sold 100, 000 USD worth of
routers and switches to be used in the Golden Shield project. 172
Cisco’s alignments with the government are also extremely evident from the firm’s own
publicized statements. On January 13, 2009, CEO Jim Sherriff described the projects Cisco had
with government agencies as having the goals of focusing on “education, R&D […] and the
building of a harmonious society” 173 Harmonious society is the term Premier Hu Jintao coined in
2005 to explain the government’s new vision for China. Ideally, this policy espouses maintaining
economic development and growth without neglecting any of the socio-political problems
existing in China. 174 Ideally, this policy will usher in democracy and reinforce rule of law;
however, in practice, the policy supports “prosperity, solidarity, and consensus” and “a ruler’s
ability to balance his desire to be lenient with the need to be harsh toward his people.” 175
Harmonious society, then, is just another tool to “harmonize” the nation under the will of the
government. In referencing government policies, Cisco is showing that it is aware of government
goals and that it is aligned with the government—the firm is willing to comply with government
demands.
Cisco’s willingness to comply is derived from the fact that China and the developing
world is where future growth in network and infrastructure development lies. In most developed
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nations, the market for Cisco’s goods is already saturated and Cisco itself has captured more than
70% of that market. Whereas, in China, Cisco has only secured 49% of the market and the
potential for growth is still extremely high because of the need for further development. 176
Furthermore, Cisco’s compliance with government rules has handsomely rewarded the firm—the
government needs Cisco’s help in realizing its development plan. To date, Cisco has received
contracts with all three major telecom companies in China in addition to contracts with some of
the biggest banks as well. 177 Its willingness to comply is also due to the lack of negative
consequences. Unlike companies such as Google and Yahoo, Cisco does not have a direct role in
censorship—it only provides the equipment that supplies network access. As a provider of
equipment, Cisco does not have the responsibility of upholding the privacy or needs of any
individual because the firm does not decide how the equipment is used—that is in the
jurisdiction of the state, ICPs, and ISPs. Furthermore, this also implies that Cisco, unlike Google,
will not suffer a breach of its own corporate security because it does not have information
pertaining to parties of interest to the government. Also, as the leading provider of routers and
switches, Cisco is unlikely to suffer any backlash from its decisions—companies and
governments will still need Cisco’s help in maintaining and updating their networks and network
infrastructure because there is no better substitute. Therefore, given these conditions, there are no
incentives for Cisco to change its strategy any time in the future.
Both case studies reiterate the theme of this chapter—indirect censorship is best
encouraged through non-coercive means. The government is able to retain control and influence
over firms and individuals alike because the party can manipulate its power and resources to
176
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appeal to the desires of those they want to control. Through appealing to patriotic feelings, the
government can build support for themselves while vilifying its enemies and critics. Through the
use of financial tools and market regulations, the government is able to persuade firms that it is
in their best interest to comply with the government on policies such as censorship. Furthermore,
the appeal of compliance is intensified by the reality of the situation—the government knows
what firms value and it plays to these objectives. Firms are better able to reach their objectives
through aligning themselves with the government because they will enjoy more financial benefits
and face less stringent requirements.

Chapter 4: CONCLUSION
In the previous chapters, it has become very obvious that China is a unique case in the
study of how authoritarian regimes can maintain growth. Unlike the former Soviet Union, the
CCP did not have to choose between pursuing economic growth and development or maintaining
political authority in the nation. The Chinese government has been able to do both, and its
ability to do so can be attributed to its two tiered censorship programs that control the output of
information. The lower level, or direct censorship, acts like a rudimentary filter that serves a twofold purpose. The first is to block information on highly sensitive topics, such as Tibet or human
rights. The second purpose for direct censorship is to provide a monitoring or oversight
capability for the government. This task is a relatively easy one because of the government’s
control over the physical entities that produce and provide the output channels.
Although the direct censorship system is very sophisticated, it is not infallible. There will
always be ways to circumvent the system. Proxy servers are an example of how individuals can
bypass internet censorship. Furthermore, as China becomes more technologically integrated, it
will become harder and more costly to control all channels of communication due to the sheer
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volume of individuals connected to the network and due to the growing number of
communication tools available. Therefore, effective control over information requires the
government to develop a more elegant approach. The government must be able to convince firms
and individuals that they have no interest in disobeying the government—there must be willing
compliance. In this case, willing compliance would take the form of self-censorship. The
government is able to induce self-censorship through the manipulation of objectives. On the
individual side, the government is able to induce agreement through appealing to the nationalistic
feelings of the population. This shifts focus away from government actions and strategically
directs anger towards other targets such as the West. This blame deflection builds more support
and approval for government policies.
To gain firm cooperation, the government must be able to appeal to the firms’ objectives.
Both domestic and multinational corporations have the same goal—profit maximization. With
said goal, the Chinese government can use its growing market as leverage against the firms.
China’s rapid pace of growth and development makes it one of the most desirable investment
opportunities in the world. As the gatekeeper to said market, the Chinese government has the
ability to give or deny firms access the market. In the case of the MNCs, the government is able
to use this power to persuade the firms. By complying with the government, the firms attain the
opportunity to profit while incurring a small cost. However, failure to comply would result in
exclusion from the market and the loss of potential profits and market share. Given these options,
it is in the best interest of the firms to comply.
The Chinese government has a far wider array of inducement tactics with its interactions
with domestic firms. Not only can the government dictate access to the market, but it also
controls access to resources and funding. In this case, the government can affect the overall
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survivability of the firm. Furthermore, government influence is magnified by the fact that there is
an increasing presence of party members in private businesses. These entrepreneurs are
inherently different from pure capitalists because they owe their success to the party and because
they have been indoctrinated by the party. Therefore, when these entrepreneurs make decisions,
they do not just consider the economically optimal solution but also the politically and socially
acceptable solution as well.
This thesis does not try to extrapolate future implications, nor does it try to generalize the
findings. This thesis only serves to explain why the Chinese government has been able to control
information up to this point. Even then, the scope of the paper presented is very limited and more
research must be done to study the effects of other factors that can define the degree of control
the government can retain over information flow. Furthermore, the viability of government
policies must be studied in full. As of now, the self-censorship system is effective because the
government can align the interests of the firm with those of the party. In addition, time should be
devoted to studying where the government can maintain its incentive structure forever. Currently,
the system is highly dependent on the performance of the Chinese economy; however, in order to
sustain economic growth and development, the government must introduce financial reforms that
would change the structure of the market and probably diminish the role the government has.
Furthermore, with respect to multinational corporations, Google’s recent decision shows the
frictions do exist between MNCs and the Chinese government. MNCs find themselves facing
discriminatory practices and unreasonable demands which continuously undermine their ability
to post profits or gain market share. 178 If the government continues to uphold such policies,
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eventually, the MNCs will have no incentive to practice self-censorship. In such a case, it is very
likely that the control system will fail.
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